The Gutless Cutlass?

3 September 2021: Revisions made as a result of additional research

 Some airplanes just don't get any respect. The Vought F7U Cutlass suffers worse than most: "Ensign Killer", "the engines put out less heat than Westinghouse's toasters", "Gutless Cutlass", and so forth. And then there's the iconic photos and video of the VF-124 F7U-3 ramp strike:

Yes, that is the LSO sprinting across the deck to get out of the way, which he did. Contrary to what's reported in various places on the internet, he wasn't hurt and there were no serious injuries to anyone else on deck. The pilot was killed.

In fact, the F7U-3 had about the same thrust-to-weight ratio as its contemporaries, the F9F-8 Cougar and the FJ-3 Fury, albeit in afterburner. And that's even though Westinghouse did not meet the original engine-thrust specification. Unfortunately, it was the first fighter with afterburning engines that the Navy took to the carrier. Most pilots did not understand, much less appreciate, the tradeoff involved. Their initial perception was that "dry" engine thrust was only 2/3s of thrust in afterburner and using afterburner involved the burning of prodigious amounts of fuel, significantly limiting range and endurance.

However, there were weight and performance benefits of substituting a small jet engine with an afterburner for a big jet engine with the same thrust without afterburning and Westinghouse did subsequently deliver J46 engines with the originally promised thrust.

This reliance on afterburner for "full" power would not have been quite so evident but for the fact that the Cutlass lacked a horizontal tail. It therefore required a big, thick wing for low-speed lift since no horizontal tail precluded the use of trailing edge flaps: there was no means of counteracting the pitching moment change that was caused when they were lowered. This is a comparison of the F7U-1 and the F-86.

As a result, at low speed on a low, flat approach to an axial deck carrier, pulling the stick back to increase angle of attack actually decreased lift initially. The subsequent increase in lift was accompanied by a very large increase in drag. From the flight manual: "To change angle of attack alone results in excessive loss of altitude, and the rate of descent is so difficult to control as to preclude safe answering of altitude correction signals from the Landing Signal Officer." In other words, it might hurt when you do that, only pulling back on the stick to increase altitude on approach.

So to recover from being low or settling meant adding thrust, preferably even before the pilot got low or settling began. Unfortunately, the relatively low military thrust and high drag at the angle of attack required to attain a low approach speed meant there wasn't much excess thrust unless the afterburner was used. Which was problematical with the early afterburners. From the flight manual again: "Because increases in angle of attack from flight conditions such as making a turn, stopping a rate of descent, and initiating a climb increases the drag, caution should be exercised to assure that the airplane is accelerating prior to entering the aforementioned maneuvers. (A waveoff) must be initiated relatively early because selection of (afterburner) is accompanied by a thrust delay lasting up to two seconds. For the first three seconds following power increase, better airplane acceleration is attained in military power; after three seconds a marked acceleration advantage is obtained in (afterburner)."

The horrific F7U-3 ramp strike was actually preceded by a routine approach and landing by the pilot. The accident investigation determined that the airplane was above the maximum approach weight when it crashed, which meant it was even heavier on the first, successful, landing. However, on the second approach the pilot got low and was slow to respond to the LSO's "come on" signals.

Another frequently repeated and undeserved observation was that the Cutlass had a "weak" nose landing gear. There were several incidences of nose gear collapses (including a fatal one) but they were almost entirely due to either pilot error (landing short or long, resulting in an overload of the nose gear actuator when the nose wheels hit something) or mis-set/malfunctioning arresting gear/barrier engines, the abrupt stop again overloading the nose gear actuator. This Cutlass ran off the runway in Japan:

Contrary to another widely repeated canard, the nose landing gear strut never failed upward and speared into the cockpit, ejecting the pilot. There was one carrier-landing incident when a barrier malfunction caused an overload of the nose gear that caused the airframe attach point of its extension/retraction actuator to break loose. The upward movement of the fitting knocked the canopy off, which armed the ejection seat, and then it hit the seat's firing mechanism, ejecting the pilot. The aft side of the ejection seat headrest was modified as a result so it would only fire if the pilot pulled the face curtain.

The belief that the Cutlass was underpowered stems from the Navy's decision to repurpose the F7U-3 as a fleet air defense fighter armed with guided missiles. The addition of Sparrow I missiles, the requisite fire control system, and additional internal fuel resulted in a significant increase in weight; however, the Navy elected not to also add more thrust since the resulting F7U-3M was considered to be a placeholder until the Sparrow III armed F3H-2 completed development and qualification. That version of the Cutlass was therefore considered to be "under powered" although the thrust was adequate for the mission, particularly since its deployment was from angled-deck carriers employing a descending approach rather than a flat one. There were no incidents due to a lack of thrust.

Ironically, the F8U Crusader's handling qualities on approach were at least as challenging as the F7U's and its accident rate not much better even though it only deployed on angle-deck carriers. However, supersonic performance combined with outstanding endurance meant it was revered instead of reviled and ridiculed.

The Crusader pilot reportedly boltered with a badly damaged aft fuselage and was sent to the beach, where he landed without incident.

Post-War Eastern TBM Variants

29 August 2020: Added clarification of TBM-3J

25 July 2015: Added  background information on the TBM-3P

19 July 2015: Updated with additions, corrections, and other changes.

Rick Morgan (http://rickmorganbooks.com/index.html) and I have continued to explore the poorly documented post-war history of the various variants of the Eastern Aircraft TBM-3. The Navy still had lots of them after the war. Since they were big and easily modified, they were readily adaptable to other missions besides torpedo, glide, and level bombing that were their raison d'etre.

Most were modified from TBM-3Es. In most cases, the addition of the E would simply mean the addition of electronic equipment, in this case provisions for carrying the APS-4 radar on a stores pylon under the right wing. However, the designation is also associated, possibly coincidentally, with a redesign by Eastern to reduce weight by about four hundred pounds. One of those changes was probably the location of the tailhook, which had been internally housed on all TBFs and prior TBM production.  Most TBM-3Es delivered from Eastern probably had the external tailhook. This is an example.

There is evidence that the weight reduction effectivity in production (like the tailhook change, deletion of tunnel gun provisions and some armor, etc.) was not the same as for the APS-4 provisions. As a result, the first production -3Es did not have the external tailhook. It is also possible, even likely, that TBM-3s were subsequently modified to the E configuration (i.e. APS-4 provisions) at Navy repair and overhaul facilities but retained the internal tailhook.

Based on the information provided on Joe Baugher's invaluable listing of Bureau Numbers (see http://www.joebaugher.com/navy_serials/navyserials.html) and elsewhere, it appears that one TBM-3E production lot used a block of Bureau Numbers from a cancelled BuAer contract:

Bureau Numbers                 Mfg Number                Model

22857-23656                       1-800                            TBM-3

68062-69538                       801-2277                      TBM-3

85459-86292                       2278-3111 (834)           TBM-3E

53050-53949                       3112-4011 (900)           TBM-3E

91107-91752                       4012-4657 (646)           TBM-3E

These out-of-sequence BuNos explain why many "older" TBM-3Es, i.e. with 53XXX BuNos, are configured with an external tailhook even though its effectivity reportedly occurred at either BuNo 85566 or 86175. It also explains erroneous statements to the effect that most TBM-3Es did not have the external tailhook when in fact most do.

For sure there are TBM-3Es with the APS-4 radar and an internal tailhook. In his comment below, Pablo Montero provided a link to this example, which is reportedly a VMTB-234 Avenger circa 1945. It looks like there is an E at the end of the type designation on the vertical fin but as is frequently the case, the BuNo cannot be read.

The next interesting issue is the alphabet soup of TBM-3 variants. A suffix was used when a change was "major" and intended to be permanent, with occasional exceptions (see TBM-3J below). Note that there was no TBM-3B or -3C whereas there was a TBM-1B and -1C; this appears to have been because B stood for a British version and C was apparently an armament change (the -1C deleted the single cowling mounted machine gun in favor of one in each wing outboard of the propeller arc). There was a TBM-1D with a permanently mounted APS-3 radar on the right wing, which is apparently why the similar -3 conversions were designated -3Ds. These were a late-war modification to add an APS-3 radar on the right wing and ECM (Electronic Counter Measure) equipment. The gun and associated hardware was removed from the turret and the lower compartment by VT(N)-90  to reduce weight since its primary mission was night attack.

Some other well-known variants:

TBM-3W: A late-war modification to add an APS-20 radar in a large belly-mounted radome for airborne early warning. Some were converted from TBM-3s like 89471 so it had an internal tailhook.

Some were converted from TBM-3Es like 53894 so it had an external tailhook.

TBM-3R: A Korean War-era modification for COD (Carrier On-board Delivery); see http://tailhooktopics.blogspot.com/2013/01/tbm-3r-cod.html

TBM-3S: A post-war modification to remove the defensive armament and add ASW mission equipment. It was teamed with a TBM-3W variant to provide submarine hunter-killer capability as a placeholder for the AF Guardian. There were variations in the mission equipment and the canopy modification (one was designated TBM-3S2 to distinguish it from the 3S). Note that a crewman now occupies the compartment aft of the pilot.

TBM-3U: A TBM-3 modified to tow targets and for general utility use. All offensive and defensive hardware was removed and a tow reel was permanently installed in the aft fuselage. The tow target was presumably streamed out from the former stinger gun location just ahead of the tail wheel.

Note that BuNo 69400 was probably delivered from Eastern as a -3 and subsequently modified to carry an APS-4 radar pod under the right wing.

TBM-3J was a TBM-3E with provisions for installation of a tow target reel. The concept was that it could deploy with an air group and provide tow target services when required. It was therefore not, as can be found on internet, a TBM-3 equipped for all-weather operations, i.e. with wing and tail surface deicing.

Less well known and sometimes misidentified are the TBM-3N (see http://thanlont.blogspot.com/2015/07/tbm-3n-versus-tbm-3q.html) and TBM-3Q (see http://rickmorganbooks.com/tbm-3q-avenger.html). For example, as Rick points out in his excellent post on the latter, it did not have a belly-mounted radome like the TBM-3W as usually stated in TBM books and online summaries.

And then there are the TBM variants for which we have yet to find documentation, much less photographs. Through the magic of copy and paste, these are identified on many web sites as follows:

TBM-3H: TBM-3 modified for surface search radar

TBM-3L: TBM-3 equipped with a retractable searchlight in bomb bay

TBM-3M: TBM-3 conversion as missile launcher

TBM-3P: TBM-3 conversion for photo-reconnaissance

Of these five, for sure the TBM-3P and TBM-3L are correctly identified per Navy documentation dated November 1944.

The TBM-3P was a TBM-3 "equipped with a trimetregon (sic) camera". Rick Morgan has found "less than 10" in CASU (Carrier Aircraft Service Units) pools in San Diego and Pearl Harbor in the 1946 Allowance Lists (some are listed as TBM-3EP, which suggests that "TBM-3Ps" were converted from TBM-3s). CASUs were repair and maintenance centers at some naval air stations; they were also a storage point for airplanes that could be issued to squadrons to replace attrition. The trimetrogon camera installation actually utilized three cameras, left and right oblique and vertical, taking pictures simultaneously. This is the installation in a B-17 (see https://historicairphotos.wordpress.com/2014/05/21/trimetrogon-photography/)

The pictures overlapped so they provided complete coverage from side to side.

The TBM-3P camera installation was probably located in the lower (radioman's) compartment. Since mapping, as opposed to strike-damage assessment, was not a primary air-group mission, the TBM-3P was probably little utilized and appears to have had a short career. No pictures of one have been identified as such.

The same document lists the TBM-3L as a "TBM-3, 3D, or 3E equipped with a searchlight mounted in the bomb bay". Note that the TBM-3D had provisions for a searchlight mounted on a pylon under the left stub wing but since this was "detachable", the suffix L did not apply. (In any event, utilizing the bomb bay for this purpose seems counterproductive, which may be why there aren't too many pictures of the type—I have yet to see one.)

The description of each of the other two TBM variants is dubious. A Navy History and Heritage Command document (HERE) does not list the H and the M and identifies the J as a "utility plane", which it was since it could be configured with a tow-target capability.

At the time, the suffix H was used to designate an airplane modified to be a "hospital", i.e. to transport wounded personnel. That's a possibility, although no TBM-3Hs have been identified. There was reportedly a modification of the TBM-3W's radar to optimize it for submarine-snorkel detection but this would have, if anything, probably resulted in a modification to the existing designation (there is a TBM-3W2, for example).

There may have been TBMs with deice boots but they were not designated TBM-3Js. As noted above, these were TBM-3Es modified with provisions for target towing, the forerunner of the TBM-3U. However, they retained the carrier-basing and ordnance capability; as a result, the designation of a TBM with this capability depended on whether the tow equipment was installed or not! See the June 1947 issue of Naval Aviation News.

The TBM-3M, if there were any, was more likely a modification for weather reconnaissance like the PB4Y-2M, which was the purpose of the suffix at the time. None have been identified.

On the other hand, there are a couple of TBM modifications that we have pictures of but little or no additional information. The first is something in the bomb bay of  TBM-3E BuNo 91704 in a picture provided by Jim Hawkins via Steve Ginter. It looks like there is an opening at the bottom of the aft end of the pod and what might be static discharge wicks or antennas on the bottom of the pod. It could be an early ECM pod installed on this TBM for inflight testing.

Another is a TBM marked as a -3E, reportedly BuNo 69465 at Pax River on 18 January 1946, provided by Jim Sullivan (the TT on the cowling indicates that it was assigned to the Tactical Test division at the time). It was reportedly an attempt by Eastern to compete with the new single-seat BT—soon to be changed to A for attack—airplanes from Douglas, Martin, et al.

TBM-3N versus the TBM-3Q

I was recently asked if I had any pictures of a TBM-3Q. First, I had to refresh my memory of the type, one of several modifications of TBM-3Es, a veritable alphabet soup of repurposed Turkeys.

The TBM-3E was the last production model, redesigned in detail to reduce weight and add provisions for an APS-4 radar pod under the starboard wing.  The Eastern Aircraft Division of General Motors built 1,480 as the war was winding down and Navy contractors were completing the development of various single-engine attack airplanes like the AD Skyraider that would replace it and the Curtiss SB2C. The most obvious external difference was that the tailhook was stowed under the aft fuselage rather than within it.

The TBM-3Q was one of the first carrier-based airplanes configured specifically for electronic reconnaissance although it retained its ordnance-delivery capability so ELINT (short for electronic intelligence) was more of a collateral duty. It could also be used to "home-in" on enemy ships and shore-based defenses that utilized radar and jam the capability.

I found this picture of two "TBM-3Ns" on the excellent web site of the National Naval Aviation Museum (http://www.navalaviationmuseum.org/).

I thought that they were actually TBM-3Qs because they did not have turrets (according to one online description of the TBM-3Q, a characteristic of this conversion) and had ECM (Electronic Counter Measure) antennas identical to those on the Martin AM-1Q and the various Douglas Skyraider Qs.

I so informed the museum's library staff and got the immediate and polite response that to the best of their knowledge, the Ns did not have a turret and the Qs did. Another strike against online research.

The TBM-3N Radar Operator's position:

It appears that the TBM-3N was a postwar -3E modification to perform night and all-weather attack missions with updated electronic countermeasure avionics as a placeholder for the forthcoming Skyraider. Rick Morgan looked at some postwar location lists and estimates that no more than 30 conversions were accomplished. He found that some were assigned to the air groups linked with FDR (CVB-42) and Saipan (CVL-48) in early 1947 and early 1947/8 respectively. However most were operated by the night composite squadrons that provided detachments to deploying air groups, first VCN-1 and -2 and then their successors, VC-3 and -4. (For a brief summary of the role of composite squadrons, see http://thanlont.blogspot.com/2013/12/composite-squadrons-and-detachments.html.) TBM-3Ns were also operated by the two Fleet All-Weather Training Units, the Pacific (the two pictured above, circa 1950) and Atlantic

This is a picture from the files of the National Naval Aviation Museum of a VCN-2 TBM-3N landing on Philippine Sea in 1948.

 Note the lack of a turret.

There was wartime precedence for the removal of the turret for night attack (and in fact, none of the Navy candidates for its postwar carrier-based attack requirements, day or night, had defensive armament). VT-90N removed the turret hardware (but not the enclosure) from its TBM-3D's in late 1944 or early 1945 to lighten them. If you look closely at the turret, you'll see that a crewman is sitting there, sans machine gun.

Note that the -3D was optimized for night attack with an APS-6 radar hard-mounted to the wing and various ECM antennas. Why was it not a -3N? Good question. For my attempt to unravel the World War II Navy airplane designation suffix history, see http://thanlont.blogspot.com/2014/03/navy-aircraft-designation-suffixes-redux.html and the links therein.

So what did the TBM-3Q look like? Larry Webster came up with this picture of one in an old Japanese aviation enthusiasts' magazine.

It has the aft-fuselage antennas like those on the TBM-3N but also retains the turret.

Rick Morgan was also exploring this question as well. His TBM-3Q post that resulted is far more detailed than the one I was coming up with. See http://rickmorganbooks.com/tbm-3q-avenger.html.

Your guess is as good as mine as to why the turret was retained on the -3Q. Mine is that there was a risk that the focus of its intention to collect electronic information for future strike-mission planning might take umbrage at the fact. As it turned out, several unarmed land-based "spy" planes were shot down during ELINT missions. For incidents involving the U.S. Navy, see https://www.nsa.gov/about/_files/cryptologic_heritage/publications/coldwar/dangerous_business.pdf

Rick Morgan opined that they retained the turrets because they were assigned to VT/VA squadrons that were primarily equipped with TBM-3Es that retained the turret. Since they could be assigned to day strikes along with the other Avengers in the squadron, their crews wouldn't want to be be defenseless in that event, much less likely to be singled out initially because of the lack of a turret.

Call Sign Boron?

A couple of people have asked me about the picture of the VA-55 A-4C above. It was reportedly taken at Danang circa 1967 when the squadron was deployed with Constellation.

Although guesses included a call sign, it was a composite-structure test specimen, installed on a fleet aircraft for a evaluation in operational usage.

From the AIAA paper by A.V. Hawley and M. Ashizawa presented in October 1968 (see HERE for a link to the PDF, which was found by Phil Friddell):

"The (A-4) flap was initially selected as a suitable component for obtaining flight experience with boron filaments. The existing production aluminum flap was redesigned utilizing boron skins supported by a full-depth honeycomb core, while retaining some of the basic component aluminum parts for interchangeability reasons. A second flap design, utilizing graphite as the composite reinforcement and developed in accordance with advanced structural element concepts such as molded graphite parts to replace aluminum rib and hinge fittings was developed. The choice of skin layup and core geometry is explained. It is shown to depend not only on the strength and stability of the skin but also on the temperature and pressure conditions that exist during the cure and secondary bonding. Emphasis is placed on the problems encountered during the design and development phases rather than on those which came to light during the final detailed analysis."

The test specimen was prominently identified, in part because of the health hazards presented by boron fibers when they are burned, and since it was non-standard from a repair standpoint. "Boron" was also a reminder that the component, even damaged, was of interest to the Bureau of Aeronautics and its creators.

Aircraft structure incorporating boron composites were subsequently used in the F-14 among other aircraft.

Back from Space, But Not Home Yet

Jodie Peeler is my go-to person for the Sikorsky SH-3 (H-3) Sea King. She graciously volunteered to be the guest blogger for this post, distilling the information that she's collected over the past two and a half decades on one notable H-3 assignment:

The Sikorsky SH-3 Sea King as Recovery Helicopter by Jodie Peeler

From Scott Carpenter's Mercury mission in May 1962 to the end of the Apollo lunar program in December 1972, every NASA spacecraft crew retrieved by helicopter was recovered by a Sikorsky Sea King (1). The big, twin-turbine Sea King offered additional interior space, more power, more safety and more versatility than the HUS-1s that recovered Alan Shepard and Gus Grissom after their Mercury flights. Besides, it was natural that the Sea King be pressed into service as a recovery helicopter.

Throughout most of NASA's "expendable era," the prime recovery ships were typically anti-submarine warfare carriers (CVS), with Sea King squadrons already part of their air group. Sending a CVS allowed the Navy to provide NASA a large, capable recovery ship without diverting a scarce "big deck." (2) Although an LPH might be pressed into service with an HS detachment aboard for some missions (3), the CVS became the classic recovery ship, immortalized in countless pictures, film clips, and even model kits.

One particular SH-3 itself became an icon. In particular, an SH-3D with the Bureau Number 152711 became a celebrity for its recovery of the first five Apollo flights to the Moon. You may not know the number 152711, but chances are you've seen pictures of "Old 66," a helicopter so famous it even inspired a love song. (4)

Over the years the saga of "Old 66" has been told time and again, and a certain mythology has built up - as have some misconceptions. What follows is my attempt to assemble some things I've learned, based on what I've found in readings and research.

THE RECOVERY OPERATION

For an Apollo recovery mission, a prime recovery ship embarked eight SH-3A or SH-3D aircraft and associated personnel from the squadron. This provided plenty of aircraft for the recovery mission, as well as spare aircraft in the event one or more had an issue. The aircraft were maintained in excellent condition and logged many hours in simulation exercises (SIMEX) prior to splashdown day. On a typical recovery, four helicopters participated, with one remaining aboard ship ready to go if needed. Each had a four-person aircrew, plus additional personnel as indicated. This is the deployment for Apollo 11 in July 1969:

 - RECOVERY ONE: The prime recovery helicopter, responsible for picking up the astronauts and bringing them back aboard the ship. RECOVERY also carried a NASA flight surgeon, who would make initial assessments of the astronauts once they were aboard; RECOVERY also carried the leader of the Underwater Demolition Team to the recovery site. On flights that observed quarantine protocol, RECOVERY also carried the Biological Isolation Garments (BIGs) and decontamination equipment to the splashdown site.

- SWIM ONE and SWIM TWO: Each carried three Underwater Demolition Team swimmers to the recovery site. These swimmers would secure the spacecraft and assist the astronauts during recovery, then stay with the spacecraft until it was retrieved. On Apollo 11, SWIM TWO deployed its swimmers, while SWIM ONE hovered nearby with its swimmers as a waiting backup. After the astronauts were aboard RECOVERY, SWIM ONE flew wing with RECOVERY back to the recovery ship as a precaution, while SWIM TWO "babysat" the spacecraft and swimmers until the PRS arrived. (5)

- PHOTO ONE: Carried two cameramen to capture still and motion picture images of the recovery operation. Live television capability became possible starting with Apollo 13 in April 1970. (6)

- In addition, SWIM THREE, with a crew of four plus a UDT swimmer, stood by aboard the recovery ship ready to go if needed. - Recovery ships with fixed-wing capability also launched two Grumman E-1 Tracers, one to serve as on-scene commander (call sign AIR BOSS) while another (call sign RELAY) relayed on-scene communications back to the task force headquarters in Hawaii. (7)

 MODIFICATIONS TO RECOVERY HELICOPTERS

In spite of what has been written elsewhere, none of the SH-3s used by HS units for spacecraft recovery were purpose-built rescue helicopters. They were on temporary duty from their normal ASW/SAR mission, and none of the aircraft were specialized rescue aircraft. (This changed starting with Apollo 15, when recovery duty became the task of HC-1 and its SH-3Gs.) (8)

Instead, temporary modifications were made to the SH-3A/SH-3D aircraft used in recovery operations. It became typical to remove the AN/AQS-13 sonar equipment in most of the embarked helicopters and cover the top of the sonar well. (9) This opened up space in the cabin for crewmembers to move around, room for recovery gear, and to provide space for the astronauts and the NASA physician to move around aboard the recovery helicopter.

Removing the sonar also made room for the SARAH (Search and Rescue and Homing) equipment. This system provided a radio-detection system for locating the spacecraft. It used Yagi-type antennas mounted at the top of the port and starboard sponson struts; the first recovery helicopter to sport these antenna was the Gemini 12 recovery helicopter in November 1966. The signals were fed to receivers in the helicopter's cabin, and crewmen could use the signals to direct the pilots toward the spacecraft's location. (10)

Not every aircraft embarked aboard a recovery ship would be modified. Of the eight SH-3Ds embarked aboard USS Yorktown for the Apollo 8 recovery in 1968, six aircraft had their sonar equipment removed, and five of those had SARAH equipment installed. These modifications were performed aboard ship by squadron personnel, using parts supplied to the squadron. (11)

Starting with Apollo 10, the recovery helicopter was equipped with an uprighting sling made of half-inch nylon line. One end of the sling was attached to a weapons shackle; the other end was taped in place below the starboard cabin door. If the command module was apex-down (Stable II) after splashdown, a helicopter crewman could lower the free end of the sling to a swimmer in the water, who would attach the sling to the spacecraft. The helicopter could then pull the spacecraft over to upright (Stable I) position. (12)

Other modifications to the prime recovery helicopter included installation of photo and film cameras on the starboard side. Two 70mm motion picture cameras and a 35mm still camera were carried on a specially-made mount on the starboard aft weapons position, and at least one camera was mounted on the starboard side between the sponson and the fuselage that was used to take this picture of Apollo 13 Astronaut Jack Swigert.

These cameras were pointed down to capture images of the recovery operation that could be analyzed after the mission. These supplemented the still photos and motion pictures captured by the PHOTO helicopter.

The cameras mounted on recovery helicopters had no capability to transmit live television pictures. Television audiences were limited to what the cameras aboard the recovery ship could see. Live television direct from the recovery scene did not happen until Apollo 13 in 1970, when a live television relay from the PHOTO helicopter finally became a reality. (13)

THE HISTORY OF BUNO 152711, "OLD 66"

Bureau Number 152711 (Sikorsky serial number 61-377) was constructed as an SH-3D and completed on March 4, 1967. It appears to have spent its entire career with the "Black Knights" of HS-4.

At this point I have not found out why 152711 was selected as prime recovery helicopter for Apollo 8; perhaps it was the aircraft in best condition, the squadron CO's preferred aircraft, that its side number—66—had a certain something, or just luck of the draw. Regardless, it was 152711 that brought the astronauts aboard Yorktown on December 27, 1968, as live television from the recovery ship presented the historic moment to a worldwide audience.

As it happened, 152711 was also used for the Apollo 10, 11, 12, and 13 recoveries. By late 1969, even though it had received a different, three-digit side number, for the Apollo 12 mission that was painted out and replaced with "66"!

For a online gallery of pictures from the Apollo 11 recovery at the USS Hornet Museum web site, see http://usshornetmuseum.org/PhotoGallery/gallery.php?galleryFolder=1969_CVS_12_Apollo_11

The USS Hornet Museum staff has also posted a gallery for the Apollo 12 recovery: http://usshornetmuseum.org/PhotoGallery/gallery.php?galleryFolder=1969_CVS_12_Apollo_12

Although 152711 was repainted and renumbered a few times after its last spacecraft recovery mission, it always bore five Apollo spacecraft symbols on both sides of the nose.

Old 66 was reportedly slated to be presented to the Smithsonian Institution when after it was no longer needed by the Navy. Unfortunately, it did not survive to be so honored for its prominent role in the Apollo program. On 4 June 1975, during a night training mission using its dipping sonar, 152711 crashed into the ocean off NALF Imperial Beach, California and sank. All four crewmen were rescued although the pilot subsequently died of his injuries.

At the time of the accident, 152711 had logged 3,245.2 flight hours and flown from at least seven aircraft carriers and helicopter landing craft. Although there has been interest in locating and raising it for restoration, the effort and expense of doing so from 800 fathoms deep have so far been prohibitive.

At least three SH-3s now on display have been repainted to resemble "Old 66".  Two of these aircraft, BuNo 148999 aboard Hornet (http://www.uss-hornet.org/) and BuNo 149006 in the Evergreen Aviation Museum(http://evergreenmuseum.org/), are themselves actual recovery helicopters, Gemini 4 and 7 respectively. (148999 was repainted for the 1995 motion picture Apollo 13.) The third is BuNo 149711 aboard Midway in San Diego.

Notes:

1. Several spaceflights ended with the astronauts coming aboard the recovery ship by means other than helicopter. This includes Mercury 6, Mercury 8, Mercury 9, Gemini 6A, Gemini 8, Gemini 9, all three Skylab missions, and the Apollo-Soyuz Test Project. This was sometimes due to the spacecraft being retrieved by a smaller backup recovery ship; other times, it was because the spacecraft landed close enough to the carrier. The long duration of the Skylab missions meant keeping the astronauts aboard the spacecraft until it was aboard ship was a safer move.

2. One myth that will not die is that USS John F. Kennedy was to have recovered Apollo 11 in order to honor the late President who sent us to the Moon, but that President Nixon vetoed this plan for political reasons. In reality, diverting JFK from the Atlantic Fleet to the Pacific just for the recovery mission would have been a logistical and operational nightmare, impractical for many reasons. Correspondence between CNO Thomas Moorer and NASA Administrator George Mueller details that a CVS was chosen over an LPH because the CVS was a more prestigious ship for such a high-profile mission. Hornet herself was selected because she was readily available; had been training for related missions; was more capable than an LPH; and would not have diverted a larger carrier from duty off Vietnam. The historical record more than justifies Hornet's selection, as ship, crew and squadrons performed magnificently on a challenging mission.

3. Missions recovered by an LPH included Gemini 10 (USS Guadalcanal, with HS-3 detachment), Gemini 11 (USS Guam, with HS-3 detachment), Apollo 9 (USS Guadalcanal, with HS-3 detachment), Apollo 10 (USS Princeton, with HS-4 detachment), Apollo 13 (USS Iwo Jima, with HS-4 detachment), and Apollo 14 (USS New Orleans, with HS-6 detachment). In addition, an HC-1 detachment with SH-3Gs was deployed aboard USS Okinawa for Apollo 15, and aboard USS New Orleans for its three recoveries during the Skylab and Apollo-Soyuz era. Gemini 8 would have been retrieved by USS Boxer had the mission gone as planned.

4. The lyrics for "Helicopter U.S. Navy 66" may be read here, among other places: http://www.songcoleta.com/lyrics/helicopter_us_navy_%2766_%28samantha%29

5. Several accounts tell the story of how SWIM TWO got the call, including Scott Carmichael's "Moon Men Return: USS Hornet and the Recovery of the Apollo 11 Astronauts" (Naval Institute Press, 2011), p. 178-183. Live TV coverage of the Apollo 11 recovery also shows SWIM ONE flying RECOVERY's wing on the way back to Hornet.

6. The live coverage of the Apollo 13 splashdown, with plenty of live video from the photo helicopter, may be seen starting here: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=swTUBotqTRk

7. Much of this is adapted from Bob Fish, "Hornet Plus Three: The Story of the Apollo 11 Recovery" (Creative Minds Press, 2010), p. 107.

8. Al Adcock's "H-3 Sea King In Action" (Squadron/Signal Publications, 1995) implies that the SH-3s that recovered Apollo astronauts were specialized SAR variants. However, multiple sources from the period confirm the SH-3A and SH-3D aircraft from HS squadrons were fully-capable sub hunters whose primary mission was antisubmarine warfare. Had it not been, there would have been no need to remove the dipping sonar from these aircraft; and had it not been, 152711 would have not crashed during a night ASW training exercise in 1975.

9. Removal of the AN/AQS-13 equipment and installation of the SARAH equipment is mentioned in the HS-4 summary from USS Yorktown's Apollo 8 post-recovery report, provided to the author by the Naval Historical Center.

10. The first mission with Yagi-equipped recovery helicopters was the Gemini 12 recovery in November 1966, as can be seen in contemporary photos and films of the recovery. Details on the SARAH installation aboard the helicopters comes from Fish, p. 79-80.

11. USS Yorktown Apollo 8 post-recovery report.

12. Fish, p. 80.

13. Ben Kocivar's article "Waiting for Apollo 13" in the August 1970 "Popular Science" mentions the live television from the recovery scene: https://books.google.com/books?id=kgEAAAAAMBAJ&lpg=PP1&pg=PA44

FDR Circa 1951, Turning Into the Wind

John J. McKenna brought this photograph to my attention.

He found it on the excellent FDR website—http://ussfranklindroosevelt.com/—that I had not seen before. It was in this section of photographs—http://ussfranklindroosevelt.com/?page_id=2351—contributed by Don Savercool, FDR Photo Lab 1951-1952.

At first glance, it is a picture of an air group readied for launch (the Panthers are manned, most of the propeller-driven airplanes are running)  as Roosevelt turns into the wind. Most of the Panthers are in the experimental natural metal scheme (see http://thanlont.blogspot.com/2009/12/it-seemed-like-good-idea-at-time-vii.html).

But on closer inspection, the "air group" gets far more interesting.

1. This F9F-2 is painted blue on top but what appears to be light gray on the bottom instead of being overall blue. In-fight experiments were conducted with different paint schemes because when viewed from below at high altitude, blue airplanes were very conspicuous. This is one of the schemes:

2. All the -2s appear to numbered sequentially in the 2XX squadron series but don't have any tailcodes (in a comment below, "bigredlancer" notes that the badge is between the national insignia and the front of the windscreen is the Jolly Roger of VF-61, which was assigned to FDR for its early 1951 Med deployment). The highest number is 217, which is unusually an high number for a single squadron. Moreover, the natural metal experiment involved 100 F9F-5s, not 2s (although I have seen one picture of an unpainted F9F-2, which has also has the Jolly Roger badge in the same location as the FDR picture and moreover is a 2XX airplane); the airplanes were parceled out a few to a squadron rather than equipping an entire squadron; and most significantly, the experiment began in April 1952. Note that all the Panthers are spread (normally the wings would be unfolded as they taxi forward to the catapult).

3. There are four F8F Bearcats arrayed behind the Panthers. I had thought that this was rather late in the day for them but it turns out that in addition to being flown in the reserves and for advanced training at the time, VC-62 was still providing detachments of F8F-2Ps to the carriers then deploying to the Med like FDR. The external stores under the wing also seemed unusual (when required, F8F external fuel was almost always provided by a single centerline tank) but it turns out that two 100-gallon tanks were not uncommon on the -2Ps. (Thanks to John J. McKenna for straightening me out on that.)

4. There are five Douglas AD Guppies behind the Bearcats. That's more than a standard air-group complement.

5. There are three JDs behind the ADs. It looked at first like they might be B-25/PBJs but what looks like an H-tail on the one on the right is the vertical blade of the left and right propellers on the one behind it. Obviously these are not carrier-based aircraft (they were used to tow or launch gunnery targets) and have been craned aboard. However, they could easily be deck launched, which may be why they are at the back of the pack.

So what's going on here? My guess was that in mid-1951, FDR was being used between its deployments to the Med to transport this collection of airplanes from somewhere (Norfolk Overhaul and Repair?) to somewhere on the east coast. They have been craned aboard and are being deck launched to get to their ultimate destinations. The Panthers are probably part of the early inflight paint-scheme evaluation accomplished before the decision was made to do an extended durability test. However, see the comments on this post for more informed opinions...

American Military Training Aircraft