HU2K Seasprite Book - Wayne Mutza

 Coming soon: https://youtu.be/N69WLni7KQQ?si=govOhHV64PsLZCJy

 https://schifferbooks.com/products/kaman-h-2-seasprite

 Also see: https://thanlont.blogspot.com/2017/02/carrier-plane-guard-by-helicopter.html

 

Ginter Books

 Steve Ginter no longer has his own website but he is still creating and publishing books. You can contact him directly for availability and pricing (nfbooks@sbcglobal.net ) or look for them here: https://daviddoylebooks.com/ginter-books-covers?rq=Ginter

Kaman Synchropter History

 Hot off the press:

81 pages: A detailed and well-illustrated history (if I do say so myself) of Kaman's development of the synchropter and successful marketing of it for U.S. Navy, USMC, and USAF helicopter requirements.

Available directly from Steve Ginter:  1754 Warfield Circle, Simi Valley CA 930063 for $34.95, media mail shipping, U.S. only,

The Chance Vought F7U-3 Cutlass

 

Now available to order from:

Amazon US: https://www.amazon.com/Vought-F7U-3-Cutlass-Tommy-Thomason/dp/1800352948

Amazon UK: https://www.amazon.co.uk/Vought-F7U-3-Cutlass-Tommy-Thomason/dp/1800352948

Modex Number

 I meant to post this in this blog but it wound up HERE.

Operation Eldorado Canyon

 In case you’re wondering why I reviewing a book with a USAF F-111 profile on the cover in a Naval Aviation blog:

  1. I’ve spent almost three decades, with limited success, trying to establish that its USN counterpart, the F-111B was not a failure so anything about the program is of interest to me. I am pleased in that regard that while the author’s summary of the Navy variant’s failure to enter service is brief, it is respectful.

2. The content includes a description of the participation of carrier-based US Navy aircraft, which played a significant role in Operation Eldorado Canyon as well as involvement in events leading up to it (e.g., Operation Prairie Fire) and a subsequent encounter with Libyan fighters.

This is an authoritative and detailed account of a major bombing mission, well-written and impressively illustrated (many, most large, and almost all in color), printed on high quality paper with a soft cover and “perfect binding”. The author was not only a F-111 Weapon System Officer, but he was also involved in the mission planning and personally knows many of the pilots and fellow WSOs who flew it.

One result of the author’s experience is the detailed description of the F-111’s mission capability at that time: the aircraft itself, the weapon system, and armament options. Jim provides a particularly lucid description of the weapons, tactics, radar/FLIR navigation, and laser targeting required for a precision strike at a predetermined moment (literally) with minimal collateral damage.

Context provided for the need for the bombing raid begins with the independence of the American colonies, segueing smoothly into a year-by-year account of the early 1980s as Libyan leader Muammar Qaddafi became more and more involved in sponsoring international terrorism. As tensions heightened, the narrative rapidly increases in detail until during the raid itself, it is minute to minute.

The planning process, including the mission constraints, the rationale for decisions made, selection of targets, is particularly well described, although if anything, Jim sugarcoats the refusal of the French and Spanish leadership’s refusal to allow the F-111s to fly over their countries, significantly increasing the distance and degree of difficulty involved. As Jim succinctly describes it, “(The) 5,000-mile (9,012km) round trip was like taking off from Washington DC at dusk and flying high level to Las Vegas, then letting down to low level to bomb Los Angeles in the middle of the night with lots of angry people trying you shoot you down once you cross the mountains into the Los Angeles basin. After that, you fly back to Las Vegas, arriving nearly out of fuel and needing to find your tanker in the pitch-black darkness.” “Oh, and you’re doing all this in a space about the size of a sports car interior, strapped into your seat the whole time: about 13 to 14 hours.”

Execution of the resulting strike plan requiring a large number of USAF and USN assets is described in detail and clearly delineated in a series of color maps, both large scale (depicting the entire route of the bombers and tankers to and from England) and small (the detail of each ingress to and egress from each target). The order of battle of all the participants, including the supporting cast, is remarkably complete, the result of Jim’s years of research.

Like all plans, particularly one involving as many moving parts as this one, there were successes and failures relative to the desired outcome, including collateral damage and the loss of one of the strike F-111s. Jim pulls no punches in that regard and provides a particularly cogent Lessons Learned conclusion.

Note that in my opinion, the above does not begin to do Jim’s book justice. It is not only an excellent description of a seminal event in America’s history, but also an excellent read.

Carrier Landings - Canopy open or closed?

 

Navy pilots landed the early jets on carriers as they always had, with the canopy open. It facilitated rapid egress from the cockpit if they had to ditch.

If the engine quit, below about 1,000 feet, ejection was not an option to ditching.

The early ejection seats were primarily bailout assists, necessary at the higher speeds that the jets were capable of compared to piston-engine powered fighters.

However, on axial deck carriers a last-ditch barricade was added for jet landings because the Davis barrier—that was intended to stop them if they failed to be arrested by the customary means, the tailhook engaging one of the arresting cables—could sometimes be defeated (see https://thanlont.blogspot.com/2010/10/barriers-and-barricades-one-more-time.html).

This, however, introduced a new concern, that the heavy cable going across the deck at the top of the barricade might wind up in the cockpit instead of ending up aft of it.

 As a result, jet pilots had to choose between the possibility of ditching with the canopy closed and unable to get it open in time and that of landing long and getting decapitated by the barricade's upper strap.

As it happened, many of the subsequent generation of carrier jets had clam-shell rather than sliding canopies and were therefore closed on both landing and takeoff. The two Douglas F4D Skyray prototypes actually differed in that respect, with the clam-shell being selected for production:

                                          BuNo 124587 is on the left and 124586 is on the right.

 My guess is that given the cockpit pressurization required, the clam-shell configuration was lighter and became the standard.