By Tommy H. Thomason

Wednesday, May 25, 2011

A-12: It Ain't Over Until It's Over


The Supremes have spoken. Unanimously. Basically, they have sent the contractors, Boeing and General Dynamics, and the federal government back to square one. In case you, understandably, haven't been paying attention, the Navy terminated the A-12 Avenger program for default in January 1991, reportedly at the direction of the Secretary of Defense, and demanded the return of $1.35 billion in progress payments. The contractors not only disagreed that they owed the Navy any money, they sued the Navy for $1.2 billion that they had incurred because the termination was for default, not for the Navy's convenience.

There were eventually trials. The contractors won the first in 1995, which the government successfully appealed. The government won the second in 2001, which the contractors successfully appealed. Things dragged at that point, in part because the contractors and the government unsuccessfully tried to agree to a settlement. In May 2007, the Court of Federal Claims, on review, decided in favor of the government, agreeing that the Navy had properly terminated the contract for default. In June, 2009 the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed this judgment. Boeing and General Dynamics sought a rehearing before the full Court of Appeals but their request was denied in November 2009, leading to their appeal to the Supreme Court. No money had exchanged hands so the amount claimed on each side had about doubled with interest.

In September 2010, the Supreme Court agreed to hear part of the contractors' appeal but limited the scope of their review to the Fifth Amendment issues. They declined to review the termination for default issue itself.

Their ruling was issued on 23 May. The good news for the contractors was that the Court of Appeals decision was vacated. On the other hand, the Supreme Court did not reinstate the earlier judgment against the government either: "When, to protect state secrets, a court dismisses a Government contractor’s prima facie valid affirmative defense to the Government’s allegations of contractual breach, the proper remedy is to leave the parties where they were on the day they filed suit."

For the compete text of the opinion (it's short), click HERE.

This doesn't mean that the 20-year dispute is over. There was still the question as to whether the Navy had a obligation to share highly classified information with the contractors, leading to their poor performance against the contract requirements. One or both sides may elect a do-over of the litigation within the constraints identified by the court.

Monday, May 16, 2011

Carrier Onboard Delivery

22 February 2019: I added an example of an AD-5 being operated by a VR squadron

This is a work in progress...

Carrier Onboard Delivery (COD) is the mission of delivering people, mail, and high-priority cargo to a carrier at sea by air. COD doesn't seem to have been a mission, certainly not a dedicated aircraft, before about 1950. For one thing, up until then there were a goodly number of airplanes in the air group with more than one seat and a bomb bay  that could be used for transportation by air to and from the carrier. Tailhook-equipped utility aircraft like the Grumman J2F Duck could also be used when necessary.

The airplanes in the air group were fairly simple and reliable in any event. However, as the single-seat AD Skyraider, which did not have a bomb bay, began to replace the SB2C Helldivers and TBM Avengers and airplane electronic systems grew in number and complexity, a logistics gap appeared.

The first solution was the TBM-3R, R being the Navy designation at the time for a transport. This was one of several conversions of surplus TBMs to other purposes. In this case, the gun turret was removed and the canopy extended over the tail gunner's position. Two seats were installed in the compartment aft of the pilot and two in the former turret area. Two seats were also provided in the former radioman compartment below the turret area for a total of six passenger seats. One was usually occupied by the load master/crew chief, leaving the other five available for passengers. A basket was installed in the bomb bay for cargo.

The TBM-3R appears to have been introduced in 1950 or so. For certain, it was in widespread use during the Korean War.
For more on the TBM-3R, see http://tailhooktopics.blogspot.com/2013/01/tbm-3r-cod.html

The AD-5 was the next COD development. It was created as a multi-place, multi-purpose modification of the AD Skyraider. The upper fuselage was widened to provide side-by-side seating for a pilot and a crewman and create a compartment aft of them for additional crewmen.
 Previous multi-place versions of the Skyraider for airborne early warning and night attack missions had a crew compartment in the fuselage aft and below the pilot. In additional to the mission-dedicated AD-5W and AD-5N, the Navy also bought AD-5s that were only equipped for day attack so the large aft compartment was empty. It could be filled with four litters, four rearward-facing passenger seats, or cargo. AD-5s were assigned to the transport squadrons for COD missions but none received a R suffix. This is a VR-22 AD-5 flying from Intrepid on 9 November 1954.
 National Archives 80-G-652832 via Jim Sullivan

Neither the TBM-3R or the AD-5 was capable of filling two of the Navy's emerging high-priority cargo requirements, jet engines and nuclear weapons. The result was a variant of the Navy's new twin-engine, antisubmarine warfare aircraft, the Grumman S2F. Designated the TF-1, it had a slightly wider and somewhat deeper fuselage with a large double door on the left side of the fuselage and windows on each side. Nine seats could be set up in the passenger compartment to accommodate eight passengers and the load master.


The TF-1 first flight was made on 19 February 1955. The use of a "T" prefix (rather than and "R" suffix) designation was that was the majority of the roles originally envisioned for the aircraft and used as the justification for its procurement were as a trainer.
Grumman built a total of 88. It could carry a  payload of about 3,500 pounds for 1,000 miles. On 26 June 1958, a TF-1 delivered a J34 engine to Yorktown, 300 miles at sea, the first use of its cabin capability to deliver one. In 1962, the TF was redesignated C-1A. At one point, many aircraft carriers had a TF/C-1 directly assigned, not as a detachment or otherwise part of the air group/wing.

In 1963, the CNO was reportedly concerned about resupply of the carriers of essential items too big for the C-1 and requested an evaluation by NATC of the C-130 for operation to and from Forrestal-class carriers. The first question was whether to train a C-130 pilot to make carrier landings or checkout a carrier-qualified pilot in the C-130. The obvious answer was that a fighter pilot, LT James H. Flatley III, would fly it along with another carrier-suitability branch pilot as copilot and a C-130 flight engineer volunteer from VR-1. The NATC pilots were checked out in the C-130 by a Lockheed test pilot. The changes to the C-130F, BuNo 148798 borrowed from the Marine Corps, were minimal and did not include the addition of a tailhook: the nose gear strut response was stiffened by the substitution of a smaller bleed orifice, higher capacity brakes were installed, and the external tanks were removed.

After shore-based trials established the feasibility of taking off from and landing on a carrier and the best technique to be used, at-sea trials were accomplished aboard Forrestal (CVA-59) in October 1963. No significant difficulties were encountered in takeoffs or landings, with a maximum takeoff weight demonstrated of 121,000 pounds. While the evaluation demonstrated the feasibility of resupply using the C-130, it was decided that the capability was not practical given the disruption of normal carrier operations when it was aboard and the risk that the C-130 might go hard down after landing, requiring it to be dumped overboard under certain circumstances due to the deck space it took up.

In any event, the Navy had already decided to buy a COD derivative of its new AEW airplane, the Grumman E-2 Hawkeye, configured for carrier onboard delivery. The E-2A had first flown in October 1961 and was first deployed in 1965. The C-2 first flew in 1964, with the wing and engines from a prototype E-2A mounted on a much wider and deeper fuselage equipped with a rear ramp. It had a four-man crew and could carry either 26 passengers or total cargo of about 10,000 pounds or a mix of passengers and cargo. Maximum range was about 1,200 nautical miles. C-2A production totaled two conversions from prototype E-2A BuNos 148147/8 and 17 new airframes, BuNos 152786-2797. The first of these entered service in 1966. The C-2s were not assigned to a carrier but operated by east and west-coast based Fleet Logistic Support (VRC) squadrons with detachments located worldwide.

The C-2 had the capability to carry outsized and heavy cargo but did not have as much range as desired for carrier onboard delivery in the Pacific and Indian Oceans. In the 1970s, the Navy had a competition for a much larger airplane. Boeing, Douglas, and Fokker proposed derivatives of their twin jet transports, the 737, DC-9, and F-28 respectively. Although the Navy thought that they were feasible, none were taken up at the time.

However, a Lockheed Full Scale Development S-3 Viking, BuNo 157998, was converted to a COD configuration, US-3A, in 1976. In this case, the existing fuselage was retained but the aft pair of ejection seats were removed and replaced with six passenger seats, three abreast, for five passengers and a load master. The bomb bay and electronic compartments were configured to carry cargo and a large cargo pod was created that was carried on the stores pylon. The prototype first flew in July 1976 and it was assigned to  Kitty Hawk in 1977. It not only had a range of 2,400 miles with external fuel tanks in lieu of the cargo pods, it retained an inflight refueling capability so unlike the C-2, it was not restricted to a peacetime radius of action that allowed it to return to a shore base in the event that a carrier landing was not accomplished. It could not, however, transport large items.

Lockheed proposed a US-3A with a wider and longer fuselage that utilized the S-3 cockpit, wings, stabilizer, and engines. It would have provided seating for as many as 30 passengers or cargo space/access for two large jet engines. The Navy elected not to buy it. However, in 1981 five more US-3As were converted from FSD aircraft, BuNos 157994-997, and another test aircraft, BuNo 158868, for high-priority logistics transportation in the Pacific. These were operated by VRC-50.

In the early 1980s, the Navy evaluated the addition of inflight refueling to the C-2 in order to remove the range restriction of requiring an airport alternate.
The modified airplane, BuNo 152797, was evaluated as a receiver behind the KA-6D, KC-130F/R, and KC135 tankers in both day and night conditions. Although more than 250 engagements were successfully accomplished without damage to either tanker or receiver, the conclusion was that the C-2 was not suited for inflight refueling due to its handling qualities and the consequences of failure to successfully refuel outweighed the benefits of being able to. The test airplane had its refueling probe removed and was returned to service with the external piping still present for a time.
 Photo courtesy Rick Morgan

In 1983, Naval Air Systems Command revisited the Fokker F-28 to the extent of accomplishing a flight evaluation of the Fellowship at Fokker's factory in Amsterdam and at NAS Sigonella. It would have had the payload of the C-2 and the range of the S-3. While the conclusion of the evaluation was that the "airplane has potential for the carrier-based carrier-on-board delivery, tanker, or AEW mission," no contract resulted.
 

The Navy elected instead to maintain the existing mix of the C-1 and C-2 for intermediate-range missions; the US-3 for high-speed, long-range missions with high-priority, small cargo; and a huge helicopter, the Sikorsky CH-53E, for short-range transport of large, heavy items from shore bases.

A service life extension program had been accomplished on the surviving C-2As from the original purchase of 19, with deliveries of the refurbished aircraft between 1978 and 1982. However, only 12 remained, not enough to meet the demand for COD support since the C-1s were being retired and only a handful of the volume-limited US-3As were available. After considering other options, the Navy elected the unusual step of putting the C-2 back into production although the degree of difficulty was somewhat reduced by the fact that the E-2 was still in production. The Navy bought 39, BuNos 162140-2178.

The major external difference between the original C-2s and the "reprocured" C-2s was a larger APU. Less obvious was a redesigned nose landing gear. The housing for the crash recorder/locator was not carried over to the new C-2s. The first one flew in February 1985, just in time to begin replacement of the original Greyhounds, the last of which was retired by the end of 1987.

The last C-1 in service, BuNo 146048, was retired on 30 September 1988. The last of the new C-2s had been delivered in 1990. The US-3As were retired in 1994.

In the late 1990s, the Navy considered the development of the Common Support Aircraft (CSA). It was to replace the E-2C for AEW, the S-3 for ASW, the ES-3A for signal intelligence gathering (Sigint), and the C-2 for COD beginning in 2013. (The EA-6B would be replaced by a derivative of the F/A-18F.) The concept was a victim of budget priorities and mission revaluation. The S-3s and ES-3As were retired, with ASW to be accomplished by a combination of carrier and destroyer-based helicopters and shore-based airplanes. Sigint would primarily be accomplished as before by shore-based airplanes although the F/A-18F has some capability in that regard. The E-2C continued in low-rate production and is being replaced by an upgrade, the E-2D.

As a result, there has been no replacement of the C-2s, which began going through a service life extension program including avionics upgrades in 2005. They are currently expected to serve through 2027.

The announced replacement for the C-2 is a variant of the Bell-Boeing V-22 tilt-rotor aircraft. While lacking the speed and range of an S-3 specifically reconfigured for COD and the payload-range of an improved C-2 that were also evaluated, the HV-22 will have the ability to make vertical takeoffs and landings from any ship with a suitable landing area. The range can be extended by inflight refueling and it can land on an aircraft carrier even in the unlikely event that arrested landings are not possible.
Also see http://thanlont.blogspot.com/2013/02/cod-redux.html

Monday, April 25, 2011

The Blue Angels Aircraft (Draft)

4 February 2026: Added F/A-18 E/F

This is still a work in progress. Knowledgeable corrections and comments, as well as better pictures, are welcome.

1946, F6F-5: In April 1946, as described by Robert K. Wilcox in First Blue, Butch Voris was tasked with establishing an official U.S. Navy flight exhibition team. Among the aircraft he considered were the Grumman F7F Tigercat, the Vought F4U Corsair, and the Grumman F6F Hellcat. He thought that the Corsair was the “nicest looking” but was concerned that the possibility of it stalling and snap-rolling at the top of a loop precluded close formation flying. “The Tigercat, he felt, was too big and not agile enough.” Moreover, he and many of the candidates for the team were very familiar with the Hellcat so he requested four, modified by the removal of armament, etc. to reduce weight and painted in a new distinctive color scheme. (For more information on Blue Angel markings, click HERE.) Three were flown in close formation in the air shows with the fourth available as a spare. The first public display was on 15 June 1946 at Craig Field near Jacksonville, Florida.


In this photo reportedly taken at Grumman of a Blue Angel passing overhead during their final show in the F6Fs in August 1946, the bottom of the wing appears to be marked with US on one wing and NAVY on the other. (I’ve crudely enhanced the markings which are barely visible on the photo I have.)

1946-1949, F8F-1: The team was an immediate success and very shortly reequipped with the Navy’s frontline propeller driven fighter, the Grumman F8F Bearcat. Although powered by the same basic engine as the Hellcat, it was slightly smaller and lighter, with excellent climb and roll performance. Four were modified by Grumman to remove the guns, gun sights, tail hooks, etc. and delivered to the Blues in August 1946. These early production F8Fs did not have the turnover structure behind the pilot’s headrest. They flew their first show in the Bearcats only a week after ferrying them back to Jacksonville.
The show formation was soon expanded to four airplanes.

Later F8Fs had the turnover structure added, a polished aluminum or painted leading edge on the wing and tail surfaces, and “Blue Angels” in script on the cowling.

1949-1950, F9F-2: The Blue Angels entered the jet age with the Grumman F9F-2 Panther. They initially thought that removing the Panther’s tip tanks would provide better visibility for close formation flying as well as reduce weight. However, the Panther’s tanks were necessary for cross country flights and were not intended to be readily removable (they weren’t even jettisonable) so the concept was short-lived.
However, the fact that the tip tanks couldn't be jettisoned like they could on other jets turned out to be a feature. In lieu of being able to drop the tanks to lighten the aircraft, they could be filled with colored water that was dumped to accentuate a maneuver, the predecessor of the smoke used today.

One of the show innovations implemented with the introduction of the jet was the use of a solo airplane to make passes to fill the time required for the faster jets to get turned around and back in front of the crowd for the formation's next maneuver..

When the Korean War broke out, the team’s pilots and airplanes were transferred to a fleet squadron which was converting to Panthers from Bearcats. They deployed aboard Princeton (CV-37) as the nucleus of VF-191.

1952-1954, F9F-5: The team was reformed with -5s after a hiatus for the Korean War. It had a more powerful engine than the -2. Its short stint with the team was indicative of the rapid succession of new jet fighter types in the early 1950s.

1952, F7U-1: Two Vought Cutlasses were assigned to the team in January 1952. The F7U-1 was a bit too overweight to be used as an operational airplane and was being redesigned with more powerful engines as the F7U-3. In accordance with its procurement practice, however, the Navy had begun low rate production before development was complete and had few more F7U-1s than they had test and evaluation requirements for. At the behest of Vought and with the approval of senior Navy management, two were assigned to the Blue Angels to generate publicity for the Navy's hottest new fighter. It was expected that they would be flown as opposing solos rather than be part of the formation of Panthers.
(If you look closely at the picture above, you'll note that the main landing gear is angled differently on the two F7Us. The selectable position provided better center of gravity location relative to the main landing gear wheels on takeoff versus landing .)

As it turned out, the new F9F-5s assigned to the Blues were effectively grounded for the first few months of the air show season. The Cutlasses were therefore the only airplanes available for flight demonstrations during that period and the necessary workup time after that. However, they weren’t really ready for prime time, suffering from hydraulic failures, engine fires, at least one landing gear malfunction, and excessive maintenance. In July the Blues were ready to resume shows with the Panthers so the Cutlasses were parked at NAS Memphis, the site of their last show and conveniently, a Navy training facility for aircraft mechanics.

F9F-6, 1953: The team picked up six Cougars, the swept-wing successor to the Panther, from Grumman in August 1953. The ferry flight home was marred to say the least because the team leader, Ray Hawkins, experienced a runaway pitch trim at 42,000 feet. He had to make a near-sonic ejection when the airplane bunted into an outside loop. He wasn’t badly hurt but the Cougar control system had to be modified so the Blues returned the F9F-6s to Grumman without ever performing a show in them and flew the F9F-5 for another year.

1955-1957, F9F-8: The successor to the F9F-6 was received in December 1954. Their first F9F-8s did not have the splitter plate on the fuselage in front of the engine intake. It’s not clear why the Cougar’s time with the team was not only relatively short, it was replaced at mid-season, which required the team to transition to a new airplane while still flying air shows in the old one.

1957-1958, F11F-1 (early): Before committing to the F11F Tiger, the team also considered both the North American FJ-3 and the Douglas A4D. However, neither were afterburner equipped, which added an extra element of showmanship and maneuver capability to the flight demonstration. Moreover, F11Fs from the first production lot, characterized by a shorter nose with a refueling probe at its tip, were readily available since design improvements were in work.

1959-1968, F11F-1 (late): As it turned out, the marginally improved F11Fs in the second production lot were no more in demand in the fleet than those in the first due to the superior performance of the Vought F8U Crusader, so the early short-nose F11Fs were replaced with the later long-nose version.

1969-1973, F-4J: In the late 1960s, two situations resulted in the F11F finally being replaced. First, the Navy was running out of F11Fs. Second, the Navy had bought an improved version of its front line fighter, the McDonnell F-4 Phantom, but its new radar and improved engine were not available in time to be installed in the first production F-4Js. As a result, the Navy had brand-new Phantoms with lead ballast in the nose and the prior version of the J79 engine. Twelve or so of these were made available to the Blues to replace the F11F. To improve handling qualities in the very close formation maneuvers, the control system was modified, including a change to allow afterburner to be selected at a lower engine rpm. A smoke system was also added.

Although the Phantom was a terrific air show airplane, the Blues experienced a series of unfortunate events with them. Nine of the lead-nosed Js were lost in accidents between September 1969 and March 1973, requiring replacement with a few “real” Js with the J79-GE-10 engine. Another was destroyed in early July 1973 at an air show. However, the 1973 season ended in tragedy on 26 July when a midair between the team leader and a wing man occurred during an arrival display at NAS Lakehurst NJ. The boss, the pilot of the other F-4, and a Chief Petty Office in the backseat of one of the F-4s were killed. The other Chief Petty Officer riding along was able to eject successfully.

1974-1986, A-4F: After the Lakehurst disaster with the F-4Js, the benefit versus the cost of the team was questioned at the highest level of the Navy. The debate was resolved in favor of continuing but not with the fuel-guzzling and accident-prone Phantoms. The Grumman F-14 Tomcat was deemed too expensive. The Vought A-7 Corsair II was or was not favored, depending on who is telling the story, but in any event was in short supply as the more capable strike replacement for the Douglas A-4 Skyhawk. Not only was the A-4 available, the latest variant, known as the Super Fox, had a very good thrust-to-weight ratio with its uprated J52 engine in addition to an excellent roll rate. After control system modifications, bolting up the aerodynamically actuated slats, removing unneeded equipment, and adding a smoke system and a braking parachute, it proved to be an excellent air show airplane in addition to being relatively simple and easy to maintain. Its diminutive size, relatively low approach speed, and excellent handling qualities allowed the Blues to land with all six aircraft in formation.

1987-present, F-18: By mid-1985, considering that the A-7, the A-4’s replacement in the fleet, had itself been replaced, the Blues were overdue for a change of airplane. However, options included an A-4 service life extension program as well as the new trainer, the McDonnell T-45A based on the British Aerospace Hawk. However, the Navy once again had a set of airplanes, Lot IV production McDonnell F-18A Hornets that did not have the landing gear modifications necessary for carrier operations. The F-18 required control system modifications in addition to the usual weight reduction removals and unique Blue Angel show requirement additions like a smoke system and inverted fuel system capability. The conversion to a more complicated airplane was accomplished between seasons in part by retaining the same pilots, some of whom would normally be replaced, in order that there would be no pilots who would be learning both the Blues maneuvers and the characteristics of a modified F-18. The reinstatement of an airplane with afterburners added to the crowd appeal and maneuver options.
Unlike past two-seaters operated by the Blues, the F-18B could fill in as part of the diamond if required.



In 2010, the Blues began to replace their As with the newer C model, newer being relative since the last C built by McDonnell was delivered in 1999. The Bs were replaced by Ds. 

With the 2021 show season, the Blues went on the road with the F/A-18E/F Super Hornet that two decades earlier had begun to replace the C/D in the fleet. It was somewhat bigger but similar in configuration to the "legacy" Hornets:

Hopefully, the changeover to "new" aircraft will allow the Blues to continue to be a powerful recruitment tool and good-will ambassadors for the U.S. Navy for many years to come.

Saturday, April 23, 2011

NATF: Better is the Enemy of Good Enough

Once upon a time, the Navy was developing a plan to replace the F-14 and the A-6. The Air Force needed to replace the F-15 and the F-111. In 1986, Congress essentially directed that the Navy’s fighter be the Air Force’s Advanced Tactical Fighter (ATF), its F-15 replacement, and the Air Force’s strike airplane be the Navy’s Advanced Tactical Aircraft (ATA), its A-6 replacement. The Air Force planned to buy 750 ATFs and the Navy, 618 NATFs.

The Air Force and its contractors had been planning the replacement for the F-15 for several years. A formal requirements document was first issued in January 1973. The design studies considered incorporation of the latest advancements in structures, aerodynamics, propulsion, avionics, etc to maximize mission effectiveness, with stealth being a major differentiator.

This effort culminated in a formal competition in 1986. The Air Force selected Lockheed (teamed with Boeing and General Dynamics) and Northrop (teamed with McDonnell) to build demonstrators, the YF-22 and the YF-23 respectively.

The Navy subsequently established a three-person NATF program office collocated with the Air Force program office at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio. In September 1988, Lockheed and Northrop received contracts from the Navy to study carrier-based derivatives of their proposed aircraft.

Carrier basing imposes specific design requirements for low-speed capability, low-speed handling qualities, over-the-nose visibility, compactness, corrosion protection, structure and hardware for catapult launches and arrested landings, etc. For example, in the case of the NATF, the Navy specified a maximum takeoff weight of 65,000 lbs and a landing weight of 52,000 lbs. (The Navy estimated that the difference in requirements would result in an NATF empty weight of 4,000 lbs more than the ATF’s and a gross weight difference of two to three times that.) It was to be no longer than the F-14 (62 ft) or take up more space when folded.

The basic mission requirements of the Air Force and Navy were also different. At the risk of oversimplifying, the Air Force ATF was to be an air superiority fighter; the Navy ATF also had to have the capability to shoot down enemy bombers before they could launch cruise missiles. This fleet air defense role required long range sensors, weapons, and endurance. It also inclined the Navy toward a second crewman, whereas the Air Force wanted a single-seat fighter.

As a result, the NATF designs only superficially resembled the land-based ATF demonstrators. The Lockheed NATF had variable-sweep wings like the F-14.

The Northrop NATF retained the basic wing planform of the YF-23 but replaced the stealthy ruddervators with a canard forward and vertical fins aft.

Nevertheless, the engines and much of the avionics and aircraft systems were to be common even if the airframe was not. The Air Force estimated that the engines and avionics represented 44 percent of the ATF’s unit flyaway cost.

The Northrop YF-23 was the first to fly, lifting off on 27 August 1990. The Lockheed YF-22 flew a month later. The development and evaluation programs ran almost concurrently, with the Air Force selecting Lockheed's F-22 for qualification and production in April 1991.
The Navy, however, had withdrawn from the program before then, citing the unaffordability of the ATF, its weight, and program schedule delays. At the point, the Admirals expected to keep the F-14 in service through 2015, giving them time to develop their own advanced fighter with minimal overlap of A-12 development expenditures. Unfortunately, the Secretary of Defense unexpectedly cancelled the A-12 program in January 1991. It had gotten unacceptably behind schedule and over weight. There was no push back from Congress on the complete failure of the joint program concept.
The Navy then had to deal with OSD's disagreement with its plans for an A-12 replacement and continued F-14 production. The result was the F-18E/F program, with the F being a two-seat variant of the single-seat E. The design was based on the so-called legacy F-18 Hornet, ironically a development of the losing airplane in the Air Force’s so-called light-weight fighter competition that was supposed to result in a common Navy/Air Force fighter.
The early retirement of the F-14 with its long-range Phoenix missile capability and the A-6 with its all-weather strike capability caused a furor in the Naval Aviation community but to no avail. The F-18E/F Super Hornet was decreed to be good enough.

It certainly was not nearly as advanced as the F-22, particularly with respect to stealth. Moreover, the Navy chose to initially qualify and deploy the first Super Hornets with less avionics capability than it was planned to have, which even then would be less than that of the production F-22. The uncharacteristic restraint, however, resulted in a development/qualification program that was essentially on cost and schedule and met the Navy's near-term need for F-14 and A-6 replacements. The first F-18Es deployed in 2001 while the F-22 was only then being approved for low-rate production, several years behind schedule. The Super Hornet went into action in Iraq in 2002; the F-22 was finally declared to be operationally capable in December 2005. Its first assignment? To guard the east coast of the United States, a mission that didn't require the advanced technology and capability it possessed. However, it still wasn't called to action several years later to establish a no-fly zone in Libya, with the F-22's stealthiness having been touted beforehand as being tailor made for the purpose. The reason for its no-show, according to an Air Force spokesman, Lt.Col John Haynes, was that "[the joint task force] needed to look realistically at the fighter assets already within Europe to execute operations...Because there are no F-22 Raptors based in the European theater, they were not included in the initial stages of the operation."

To be fair, the combat-proven Super Hornets were not employed in Operation Odyssey Dawn either. There were no U.S. Navy aircraft carriers in the Mediterranean at the time, Enterprise having departed in mid-February for the Arabian Sea.

The F-22 finally dropped bombs in combat for the first time in September 2014, almost 12 years after VFA-115 went into combat with its Super Hornets.


In large part because of the F-22’s very high unit cost, its production was curtailed at only 187 aircraft. In contrast, the 500th F-18E/F /G was delivered on 20 April 2011. As of mid 2015, production of the F-18E/F/G was to continue through 2017. There is a possibility that the line will continue to be kept open because of ongoing program delays with the F-35C.

The Super Hornet doesn't have the mission capability of the F-22 or the A-12, not to mention the F-14 or the A-6, but so far it is good enough.

Saturday, April 16, 2011

Bell L-39 Wing Sweep Evaluation

Early in 1946, BuAer had solicited proposals for a high-speed (jet) day fighter defined by Outline Specification 105. Cdr A.B. Metsger was the fighter class desk officer. According to his unpublished memoir:

“At that time no representative airplane had flown with significant sweep. Extensive wind tunnel data, mostly captured German reports, gave us reasonable confidence at operating speeds, but there were no data to insure satisfactory low speed flying characteristics—essential in carrier operations. “

Captain Walter S. Diehl, BuAer’s chief aerodynamicist, expressed doubt to Metsger that useful low-speed data could be obtained in subscale wind tunnel testing. However, Ivan Driggs, Head of Design Research, suggested an airplane could be built for that specific purpose quickly and economically.

Metsger therefore called his contacts at four aircraft companies that he thought would be interested in building a low-speed, swept-wing demonstrator. Bell proposed a 10-week, $100,000 modification of two surplus Army Air Force P-63As; Grumman, an ugly modification of an F4F Wildcat, including a nose landing gear, and a more expensive, all-new design that included a second seat for a test engineer and the capability to be configured with both swept and straight wings.
Grumman assumed that if a swept wing were to be substituted for a straight wing on an existing airplane, it would have to be positioned further forward so that the location of the mean aerodynamic chords was not changed.
With its tricycle landing gear, the Bell P-63 already resembled a jet airplane in configuration.

The Bell-proposed approach consisted of modifying the outer wing panels to attach to the center wing stub with a 35–degree sweep and zero dihedral. In effect, this moved the wings slightly forward relative to just mounting them at the side of body but not nearly as far forward as Grumman thought was required. Bell engineering calculated that the removal of the cannon and machine guns mounted in the P-63’s nose and the ammunition along with the addition of ballast in the aft fuselage would suffice to move the center of gravity aft so that a minimal forward shift of the wings would be adequate.

Slats were considered to be a very important part of providing adequate lift with a swept wing so the wing leading edge was modified to have five separate slat sections, any of which could be configured open or closed for flight. In the following picture, the four most outboard slats are open and the most inboard one is closed.

The aft part of the canopy was closed off for research instrumentation purposes. A panel with several gauges was mounted aft of the canopy door frame with a camera to photograph it.

This setup recorded data from instrumentation including those on booms mounted on each wingtip. The wings were marked with white lines and tufted so that cameras mounted on the canopy and horizontal tail could record the direction of the air flow as the airplane was stalled.

Since only low-speed flight characteristics were to be evaluated, the main landing gear attachment was reoriented but not required to be retractable. The wheel wells were covered over. The nose gear was still retractable.

Bell had referred internally to the aircraft as the XP-63N but the Navy formally designated it L-39 on 19 April 1946. This was consistent with the Navy’s practice for research aircraft, with the L being the letter assigned to Bell by the Navy and 39 being the Bell design number, as opposed to a model number. However, the number of at least one of Bell’s L-39 flight test reports began with 33, which was the model number of the early P-63s. L-39-1 was assigned BuNo 90060 and L-39-2, BuNo 90061.* (For more on U.S. Navy research aircraft designations, click Here.).

First flight of L-39-1 was on 23 April 1946. At some point, a lighter three-bladed P-39 propeller was substituted for the four-bladed P-63 propeller and a ventral fin similar to the P-63C's was added.

Eight flights were made by 3 May, when it was briefly laid up to incorporate a four-foot plug in the aft fuselage and a large ventral fin. The plug also reduced the stabilizer incidence by four degrees, building in more nose-up trim. The changes improved the longitudinal and directional stability.

Flight tests with different slat configurations quickly established that the stall characteristics with no slats extended were very poor: no warning and an abrupt and significant roll off. With most outboard (20%) slats open, there was no improvement. With the two most outboard (40%) slats open, there was some improvement. There was significant improvement with 60% and 80% slats, with excellent stall characteristics, as well as with a 40% slat configuration with the most outboard slat closed and the next two inboard open (60%-20%) as shown here.

With 100% slats, however, the airplane response was so bad that the test pilot recommended that testing with 100% flaps “be discontinued until further wind tunnel spin data is obtained.”

L-39-2 first flew on 29 May, configured with the fuselage plug and an even larger ventral fin.

It was also equipped with an automatic fuel distribution equalizer to maintain a desired center of gravity. It was used to evaluate a slightly different slat configuration with a narrower slot.

After Bell's short development program was complete, both aircraft were made available for evaluation flights by Navy and industry pilots. At one point, L-39-1 was configured with a "good" slat configuration and L-39-2 was set up with no slats, so pilots could make back-to-back evaluation flights. Grumman test pilot Corky Meyer flew the L-39s in late June 1946: "My flight ... with no leading-edge devices was short. It cavorted like a cat on catnip during the stalls and required excessive altitude for recovery. The second ... with leading-edge slats was docile during stalls and accelerated stalls. These stalls could be done with little wing dropping and the usual loss of altitude. The two prototypes made it clear that slatted, swept wings would provide carrier-suitable flight characteristics and stall-speed performance for fighters."

Flight test and evaluation using L-39-1 was completed at Bell on 26 August 1946, after which it was ferried to NACA Langley, Virginia, for a wind tunnel and flight correlation test program.

That concluded the Navy’s participation in the program. According to Cdr Metsger: “Our flights, including simulated carrier approaches and landings, assured us that sweeping the wings would not adversely affect carrier operations. We had the data in time for our (day fighter) competition evaluation.”

L-39-2 was repurposed in mid 1946 to support Bell’s X-2 program. The wing was modified to represent a swept wing with a circular-arc airfoil and the leading edge was extended forward to the side of body.

Bell engineering failed to appreciate the aerodynamic implications of a planform change. The center of lift was shifted far enough forward that the test pilot made most of the short flight on 20 July 1946 with full forward stick. Following reballasting, including reinstatement of the heavier four-bladed propeller, it was used by Bell for low-speed handling qualities and performance evaluation of the X-2 wing. L-39-2 was ferried to NACA Langley on 11 December, where it remained for three years. In December 1949, both aircraft were reportedly transferred to NACA Lewis where they were scrapped.

For drawings and other information of interest to modelers, click Here.

*The Navy History Center lists these two BuNos as P-63s that were cancelled.